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Secular Atmospheres: Unveiling and Urban Space  
in Early 20th Century Iran 
Sana Chavoshian ∗ 
Abstract: »Säkulare Atmosphäre: ‚Entschleierung‘ und urbaner Raum im Iran 
des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts«. Drawing on sociological approaches to urbanism 
and secularization, as well as the affective turn in anthropology, this article ex-
plores the implementation of secular policies in Iran after the 1936 Unveiling 
Decree. I argue that constructing transparent social relations reflects the emer-
gence of a new level of secular binds and relies upon the modalities of urban 
infrastructure and architecture. I find that modernization and secularization in 
Iran are interlinked by transformations in urban planning that tended to elimi-
nate sites of ambiguity and to homogenize structures and forms of interaction 
in public and domestic spaces. The article makes use of autobiographical narra-
tives that give witness to manifest changes in the urban atmosphere between 
the 1930s and 1950s. I will show how the Pahlavi regime took an active role in 
attempting to build a secular city by invoking segmentations and divisions in 
urban spaces to promote a secular atmosphere and limit religious ideas. 
Keywords: Secularity, affect, unveiling decree, atmosphere, architecture. 
1. Introduction 
On January 7, 1936, Tehran’s Teacher Training College held its graduation 
ceremony in the presence of Reza Shah, the first Pahlavi king, and his queen 
and princesses who were wearing Western-style clothes. All women at the 
ceremony were required to attend ‘unveiled.’ The presence of the king and his 
family on that day, which would later be celebrated as “Women’s Liberation 
Day,”1 was part of a plan by Reza Shah and his minister of education to accel-
                                                             
∗  Sana Chavoshian, The Humanities Centre for Advanced Studies "Multiple Secularities - 
Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities" Nikolaistraße 8-10, 04109 Leipzig, Germany;  
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their helpful comments and critiques. 
1  On this occasion, Reza Shah made the following speech: “I am excitingly pleased to observe 
that as a result of knowledge and learning, women have come alive to their condition, 
rights and privileges… You should avail yourselves of the opportunities which you have now 
to improve the country” (Mahdavi 2003, 185). According to Hikmat, on the same day he met 
with his cabinet and announced: “Today the Iranian nation joined the ranks of civilized 
countries. Europeans always criticized and scolded us because of the women’s hijab, their 
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erate and reinforce the unofficial ‘unveiling program’ (Rostam-Kolayi and 
Matin-Asgari 2014, 133). Less than three weeks prior to the ceremony, in De-
cember 1935, a decree had been announced requiring women to be unveiled. 
This unofficial decree was immediately enforced throughout Iran and also 
widely protested (Ahmadzadeh 2016, 14).  
The first protests were by men and women in religious cities such as Qom, 
and especially among clerics. Besides their opposition to the unveiling of 
women, the clerics opposed the state’s intervention in the structure of Islamic 
seminaries as the Unveiling Decree also introduced restrictive rules regarding 
the use of the turban.  
In 1936, the topic of ‘unveiling’ was well known to the clerics and the pub-
lic. Since the Constitutional Revolution in 1906, it had been a central political 
question framed as the “women’s question”2 and had been discussed in wom-
en’s associations. The associations had agreed not to make women’s attire one 
of their political priorities as they anticipated that this would provoke the anger 
of conservatives, including many clerics, resulting in further restrictions being 
placed on women.3 By the time of the decree, the diverse women’s associations 
had polarized into those supporting and those opposing the regime. 
Police and municipal officials enforced the Unveiling Decree and imple-
mented a more extreme version thereof. Officials attacked veiled women in the 
streets, tore their chadors and forcibly removed their veils (Hikmat 1975, 88). 
In the years between 1936 and 1942, voluntary female associations and their 
journals were dissolved. The state encouraged intellectual circles to include 
female family members in their gatherings and improved education conditions 
for women, increasing the number of schools and materials for them. At the 
same time, the Unveiling Decree was enforced in an increasing number of 
spaces, reaching everywhere except within women’s homes. The changes that 
resulted from the Unveiling Decree were facilitated by a reconfiguration of 
secular and religious spaces. This involved the segmentation of urban spaces 
into spaces of surveillance and private spaces free of surveillance.  
This article has two aims. First, it aims to investigate the spatial arrange-
ments and modes of urban design at the time of the implementation of the 
Unveiling Decree, e.g., the city gates, electric street lamps, and the parallel, 
widened alleys. Second, it aims to shed light on sensibilities related to architec-
                                                                                                                                
ignorance and illiteracy. Thank God we have overcome this defect too, rendering the 
country yet another service” (Hikmat 1975, 97-8. In Rostam-Kolayi and Matin-Asgari 2014, 
133). See also Chehabi (2003). 
2  On the role of women and their campaigns during the Constitutional Revolution, see Paidar 
(1995); Afary (2009); Rostam-Kolayi (2003, 157-80); Ettehadieh, (2004, 86); Kashani-Sabet 
(2011, 147-67) and Najmabadi (2008, 39-57). 
3  In his autobiography, Yahya Dowlatabadi describes how he and female family members 
worked within associations until the 1930s to support unveiling (1952, 420-1; 424-30). 
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ture and domestic spheres, which have been largely neglected in research on 
secularity. 
The changes implemented in the wake of the Unveiling Decree illustrate that 
the aesthetics of modern Iranian nation-building were similar to those in Tur-
key, Afghanistan, and central Asia during the same period. The existing litera-
ture attests to parallel changes in these countries and focuses on the necessity 
of “nation-building” and its ties to the making of the “public sphere” (Cinar 
2005, Sadeghi 2013). The new states drew “both material and metaphorical 
boundaries” to define legitimate lifestyles and national identities in gendered 
and religious terms (Cinar 2005, 34). In this article, however, I deliberately 
take a different direction, focusing on the spatial aspects of secularity in terms 
of building and promoting transparent social relations. Discourse on the ‘legit-
imate lifestyle’ was not only shaped by ideas of ‘nation-building.’ It was also 
influenced by the modernization of urban infrastructure, planning, and architec-
ture. Rather than looking at how the state defined the ‘legitimate lifestyle,’ this 
article explores how boundary drawing was configured around multiple sites of 
micro-power in urban space and how women and their religious sentiments 
came to play a fundamental role in the constitution of new spatial and emotion-
al arrangements of society creating an affect-guided divide in social life.  
Focusing on affect and secularity, I begin by examining how the state dis-
tinguished the religious from the secular by means of the 1936 Unveiling De-
cree (kashf-i hijab). I then consider how state practices gave these distinctions a 
material form. In doing so, I aim to show that the turn to a secular urban at-
mosphere, and veiled women’s local resistance to being pushed out of public 
spaces, involved new representations of identities, fields of action, and spatial 
arrangements: in the streets, houses, and the architecture of cities like Isfahan 
and Tehran. 
2. Secularism, Veiling and the Affective Dimension of 
Urban Space: The Missing Link 
Gender has become a central concern in recent studies on secularism in non-
Western contexts (Göle 1996, Najmabadi 2007, Kashani-Sabet 2011, Sadeghi 
2013). As Nilüfer Göle argues in the context of Kemalist Turkey, reading histo-
ry while ignoring the agency of women, who were a part of it, serves to high-
light solely the passively “given” and not actively “taken” nature of women’s 
rights and secular demands in public (1996, 144). These studies illustrate the 
active role played by women prior to the Unveiling Decree in political parties, 
women’s associations, and journals that discussed women’s social problems. 
The studies also point to historical evidence of the active participation and 
subsequent suppression of female intellectuals. They argue that imposed dis-
ruptions, such as the Unveiling Decree, which were the result of secularism and 
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modernization, led to emerging Islamist forms of social recognition and agen-
cy. In other words, parallel to “modern technologies of the self,” we observe re-
invented Islamic traditionalism shaping the new Islamist feminine disposition 
(Mahmood 2005). Muslim women’s agency, in this context, poses a challenge 
to Western secularism as women seek the roots that are relevant to their identi-
ty – their cultural instrument of authenticity (Nökel 2002, 144; Stauth 1999, 28) 
– at a practical everyday and institutional level. While these approaches are 
well suited to explain the religious sensibilities and the subjectivity of women, 
they are less suitable for understanding how individual transformations de-
pended on exchanges in public spaces. In other words, they neglect material 
and spatial formations which are particularly visible in the Iranian case. 
Questions of agency and cultural authenticity matter in elaborating the dia-
lectics of self-formation and institutional power in the historical encounters 
between secularism and Islam, but they need to be complemented by a broader 
view on materiality in order to achieve a robust understanding of discursive 
production itself. One expression of such adjustment lies in trans-corporeal 
feminist materialism, which emphasizes the material interconnections beween 
human corporeality and the environment (Alaimo 2008, 238). To overcome the 
limitations of the previous studies, I will analyze the 1936 Unveiling Decree as 
the topos of transparency of social relations in spatial terms, which contrasts 
with the elusiveness (see Nielsen 2016, 275) of these relations. By ‘transparen-
cy,’ I mean the spatial reordering of society in terms of a general secular com-
portment assigned to control and modernization. Such measures include the 
erasure of convoluted urban structures and their replacement with parallel, 
wide streets of uni-façade counterposed houses that cut through ethnic and 
religious districts, and measures of surveillance like patrolling the main squares 
to secure secular spaces. In contrast, ‘elusiveness’ implies a long-standing 
obstacle based upon affinities between women’s religious sentiments and the 
way they recreate spaces as sites and means of protection against visibility. 
With the emphasis on spatial segmentation as related to the senses between 
secured secular spaces and protected religious spaces, my approach draws on 
the ‘affective turn,’ a concept which has rarely been taken up in historical soci-
ology, though it is echoed in related disciplines such as anthropology, cultural 
studies, and geography. The ‘affective turn’ takes its cues from Deleuze’s 
interpretation of Spinoza and his conception of ‘affectus.’ Affect theories fol-
low Spinoza’s notion of the unity of body and mind, and his claim that the 
Cartesian notion of fully conscious human beings is a myth as the human being 
remains ignorant of its corporeality. According to Deleuze (1995), affect is an 
autonomous entity that moves through human bodies but does not necessarily 
emerge from them. Affect is not simply emotion, nor is it reducible to the af-
fections and perceptions of an individual subject. Instead, affect relies on sen-
sual intensities that traverse the subject (Thrift 2000, 219). As Deleuze puts it:  
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Percepts are not perceptions; they are packets of sensations and relations that 
outlive those who experience them. Affects are not feelings; they are becom-
ings that go beyond those who live through them. (Deleuze 1995, 137) 
Yael Navaro-Yashin describes “affective geographies” as an anthropological 
approach that studies affect and subjectivity in tandem, attending to “the em-
broilment of inner and outer world… to draw a cartography of the affects of an 
outer environment and those of interior human selves, as they are interrelated” 
(Navaro-Yashin 2012, 24). Drawing upon affective geographies, I attempt to 
break the boundaries and limitations in analysis that would bind the political in 
its seemingly rationalized institutional and discursive forms. Notably, by focus-
ing on geography and combining inner senses with the environment, Navaro-
Yashin productively opens an anthropological imaginary that views “spaces” as 
broader than the “sites” or “institutions” (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 3) in which 
politics are being produced. Drawing upon Navaro-Yashin’s approach to affec-
tive geographies, I raise the classic sociological question regarding the relation 
between urbanism and secularization, but this time from the affect perspective 
and in a non-European context.4 
While within sociological approaches, the relation between urbanism and 
secularization has been largely defined under the umbrella of narratives of 
modernity and centered on general categories, such as rational planning, bu-
reaucratized modes of power, industrial production, and consumption; new 
studies have tried to break the linearity of this relation (Becci and Burchardt, 
2013, 5). It is also aptly argued that  
sociological accounts within the orthodox model of secularization [address] 
these issues regularly at the society level but [pay] only little empirical atten-
tion to the study of secularization in actual cities. (ibid., 5)  
Affect, as it is applied in this article, encompasses this relation between urban-
ism and secularization, focusing on the tangible, material aspects. 
My focus on affect is not simply an effort to establish the sentiments that 
arose when the Unveiling Decree was implemented. Rather than studying secu-
larism and sentimental reactions, we need to gain an understanding of spatial 
segmentation and symbolic divisions that encompass affects within them. Here, 
the term “secularity” seems to capture a facet of historical experience inacces-
sible to the study of secularism and sensations. While secularization designates 
functional differentiation as the subject matter of rational institutionalization on 
the one hand and the privatization of religion on the other hand, the concept of 
secularity highlights culturally and symbolically anchored forms and “ar-
rangements of differentiation” between religion and other social spheres 
                                                             
4  It is important to stress that after Deleuze, the focus on differentiation can be moved away 
from the classic sociological assumption of its being geared exclusively by intentional ra-
tional action and similarly the concept of agency being largely dependent on rational repre-
sentation. 
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(Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012, 881). Secularity embraces social conflicts 
and negotiation processes by all agencies contributing to the momentum of 
differentiation (ibid., 882). In their definition of secularity, Wohlrab-Sahr and 
Burchardt insist on the significant role of affect and meaning. As they write: 
variations across time and space in how the religious-secular divide is under-
stood and justified cannot be reduced to structural and institutional dimen-
sions. Against the tendency to construe this divide mainly in terms of relation-
ships between church and state we suggest that cultural sociology with its 
insistence on the ineluctable embeddedness of action in the horizons of affect 
and meaning (Alexander and Smith 2002, 136) can offer new insights in the 
endurance of variations and the persistency with which they are defended. 
[…] We suggest to conceptualizing secularity by asking to which societal ref-
erence problems the development of different forms of secularity responds and 
what solution they offer for these problems. (2012, 880) 
In this sense, I am asking how the 1936 decree, which drew a line between ‘the 
veiled’ and ‘the unveiled,’ claimed to recognize women, while introducing a 
new regime of bodily maintenance that influenced people’s everyday material 
life. This new regime imposed changes that gave daily life new qualities, tem-
po, and rhythm as well as introducing visual and auditory changes. I am also 
exploring the encounter between the decree, the people it targeted, and the 
environmental setting it was imposed on, in terms of which relations it intensi-
fied, where it was challenged, and what response it received.  
In order to map the material changes in everyday life in terms of spatial 
segmentation and symbolic divisions of the religious and the secular, I draw 
upon notions like the urban atmosphere (Böhme 1993), the mobile modalities 
of architecture (Bourdieu 1970, Foucault 1990, Yaneva 2014), and transfor-
mations in the domestic sphere, in their capacities to affect and be affected.  
The ideas of atmosphere and affect are entwined (Anderson 2014, 114). 
‘Atmosphere,’ as Böhme puts it, addresses the spatially discharged and quasi-
objective feeling that tunes the space (Böhme 1993, 117-8).5 There is a spatial 
aspect to the Unveiling Decree, which has remained rather unattended in the 
scholarly literature. If we consider atmosphere, we can see that part of unveil-
ing involved separating spaces and assigning new characters to them. Of 
course, the integration of new sound media, electricity and state control over 
leisure activities marked the tone of the emergent secular atmosphere in post-
1936 Iran. At the same time, the Unveiling Decree was accompanied by efforts 
to remove religious elements from towns: Muharram street rituals were re-
stricted, as were the spaces available for religious activities, such as mourning. 
This contributed to a scenario in which the public practice of religion was 
punishable.  
                                                             
5  Compare with Randal Collins on emotional energy (2004, 118-20). 
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The idea of ‘unveiling’ was also complemented by numerous urban con-
struction projects that promoted transparent social relations. For Reza Shah, the 
old style of houses represented backwardness and traditional values such as 
extended family and associated hierarchies. Building atomized cement apart-
ments generated a sense of individualization. If we consider Bourdieu and 
Foucault’s insights on architecture, the concept of architecture here moves 
beyond representing or disciplining machinery. 
Bourdieu’s 1970 study of the Berber house opens with a long footnote on 
the importance of situating things and activities for analyzing the social rela-
tions. He states:  
the postulate that each of the observed phenomena derives its necessity and its 
meaning from its relation with all the others was the only way of proceeding 
to a systematic observation. …This postulate is rendered valid by the very re-
sults of the research program it establishes: the particular position of the house 
within the system of magical representations and ritual practices justifies the 
initial abstraction by means of which the house is taken out of the context of 
this larger system in order to treat it as a system itself. (1970, 152)  
With this statement, Bourdieu brings to the fore a unity between the built envi-
ronment and subjectivity. For Bourdieu, architecture is a medium of representa-
tion and a context of social relations.6 On a more localized level, Bourdieu 
shows that we can also develop a new status for architecture in social sciences 
that articulates habitualized practices as the outcomes of particular locations, 
neighborhoods, streets, and courtyards (Bourdieu 1977, 89-90).  
On a second level, we should note that Foucault (1977) regarded architec-
ture as an instrument of discipline within the framework of the “panoptic pris-
on.” Foucault argued that the architectural design of the prison made the pris-
oner aware that they may be under surveillance at all times, resulting in self-
discipline. As such, the prison architecture is productive: through its capacity to 
observe the prisoner, the panoptic tower’s architecture internalizes the institu-
tional power.  
Despite taking different stances, both Bourdieu and Foucault acknowledge a 
relationship between physical requirement and sociocultural interactions. While 
Bourdieu would regard this relationship as symbolic or neutral,7 and Foucault 
would consider it instrumental, both fail to explore the material aspect of archi-
tecture or, more precisely, how architecture incorporates an affective differenti-
ation. A materiality-oriented view of architecture attests  
                                                             
6  See, e.g., Lefebvre 1991, Hendon 2007, Meskell 2003, Whitridge 2004. 
7  Following Bourdieu, a trend of studying architecture has developed in the social sciences 
which focuses on extrapolating structural relations in the social context from the built envi-
ronment (see, e.g., Austin and Thomas 1990, Johanson et al. 2004, Whitridge 2004). For a 
critical approach to the application of architectural elements to the social sciences, see Ya-
neva 2013, Buchli 2013, Bille and Sorenson 2016, 3-9. 
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full deployment of material qualities, the unexpected surprises, the technical 
gesture of the maker, the unforeseen consequences and underestimated prop-
erties of materials. (Yaneva 2013, 44)  
Considering the new mode of urban architecture in Tehran,8 modern in outlook 
and atomized in nature, the architecture in this period should be dealt with as a 
construction in progress. This architecture ‘in progress’ illustrates the tension 
between transparency and elusiveness. It underlines the tension introduced by 
the more radical elements of the state’s ‘unveiling’ plans, with the construction 
of smaller houses, home to just the nuclear family, requiring women to leave 
the family home to meet others contrasting with the old urban architecture, 
which represented and protected traditional values to the point of “contradic-
tion and disjunction” (Buchli 2013, 6). 
Domesticity was a further area affected by spatial changes in the urban envi-
ronment and influenced by the Unveiling Decree. The new dynamics within 
houses took women beyond their former framework of domestic work and 
created new neighborhood networks. It should be noted here that domesticity is 
a topic area wherein the role of the ‘veiled’ woman and the use of the 1936 
decree to suppress these women has frequently been misrepresented. 
3. Methodology 
The following considerations are organized around three thematic paths: (1) 
unveiling, (2) the built urban environment, and (3) domesticity. The article 
primarily draws on the first wave of modern life-writing in the genre of autobi-
ography in Iran, the many letters and reports related to unveiling, as well as 
writings about design and landscape found in the works of architectural histori-
ans of the Qajar and Pahlavi regime in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Analy-
sis of the spatial dimension in these texts is spurred by anthropological interest 
in the method of ‘sensory ethnography,’ which promotes the analysis of peo-
ple’s sensual registers of social interactions (e.g., Howes 2003, Low 2005, 
Vannini et al. 2012), their physical environments (e.g., Ingold 2010, Buchli 
2013, Bille et al. 2014), and memory (Sutton 2001, Irving 2010, see also Pink 
2015). With my interest in atmospheres and affects, I approach the spatial 
analysis of the 1936 decree through the remarks provided in the reports from 
the municipalities’ officials and the descriptions of a changing urban environ-
ment in the works of the autobiographers. 
In the wake of Reza Shah’s modernization of means and forms of urban life, 
a group of young Western-educated men who had returned to Tehran from 
                                                             
8  It should be noted that I apply these theories solely to modern houses for the sake of this 
article. This does not mean that the traditional houses had no influence.  
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Europe found themselves confronted with the new face of the city. Biased as 
their narratives are, due to their pro secular-regime position, their high regard 
for the Pahlavi regime and their employment in the new state’s cabinet, their 
autobiographies involve their observations of walking through Tehran and 
comparisons with their lived experience in European cities. 
The autobiographies, which emerged as a literary genre in the early 20th 
century, contain details that are of particular interest for the following9: (1) 
discourse on the development of the Unveiling Decree (by Hikmat, the interior 
minister); (2) observations about infrastructure, urban construction, and plan-
ning (by Morteza Moshfiq Kazemi, 1904-1978); and (3) the dynamics of ur-
banism, rituals, and transformations in the patterns of domestic life (Abdullah 
Mostowfi, 1877-1950). Also, of relevance to these themes is a perspective from 
the intellectual circles and female gatherings (by Yahya Dowlatabadi, 1862-
1939) and the impact of the urban changes from an outsider’s perspective (by 
Abdulhussein Sanatizade Kermani). 
Further to the material of these life-writings, I draw upon dispersed data 
from various historiographies with depictions of changes in environmental 
settings, including views, soundscapes, and densities of crowds in different 
streets, modalities of daily mobility, and spatial segregations of localities. My 
own observations largely focus on: a) atmospheric descriptions of witnessed 
changes in urban residential and market areas; b) described affective imprints 
and sensual reactions to rapid changes in architecture and urban planning and 
design; c) reactions to rules and new perceptions of order; d) the reformulation 
of gendered power relations; and e) veiling and unveiling with respect to body 
and spatial arrangements. I address the very recognizable spheres of affect 
modulation and spatial transformations that provided new mundane and mate-
rial notions of what is religious/secular in the daily life of the urban regions. 
4. Tehran in a Tense Atmosphere 
Today, many historians writing about the implementation of the 1936 Unveil-
ing Decree focus on the violence experienced by veiled women. Regardless of 
their age and social class, women who remained veiled were arrested, beaten, 
or had their veils removed in the streets by police and municipal officers. 
Women were further humiliated by officials confiscating their veils or setting 
their veils on fire. The violence carried out by officials often led to further 
assaults by members of the public. However, aggressions against women in 
Tehran’s public spaces were nothing new. In his autobiography, Morteza 
                                                             
9  On the first wave of modern life-writing in Iran, see Fragner (1979). On how these autobi-
ographies related to historical and social novels, see Jan Rypka (1959). 
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Moshfiq Kazemi describes a horrifying misogynistic environment. He observed 
a group of women being lashed in the main square and, in a separate instance, 
an abducted woman being sexually harassed by a group of men. Moshfiq 
Kazemi writes: “Kidnapping and harassing women are common experiences 
for people who live in Tehran” (1958, 139-40). Against a background of vio-
lence against women in the early Pahlavi period, he argues that in the post-
decree period,  
the shift in dressing and women’s emancipation has been fully achieved. No 
woman is seen in veil anymore. The number of clerics (moamamin) has fallen 
and the bureaucratic system is operating amazingly in all organizations. (ibid., 
428)10  
Removing veiled women from public spaces required urban spaces to be re-
mapped and divided with new surveillance measures to ensure veiled women 
could be identified and denied access. Major streets, markets and main squares 
were under strict police observation even at night. A growing number of shops 
put up signs stating that veiled women were banned,11 and there were even 
attempts to impose institutional regulations for times and particular zones of 
cemeteries and shrines that were to be closed to veiled women.12 Increasing 
regulation and surveillance resulted in women perceiving new boundaries in 
their lives. 
In addition to open spaces, the banning of social services to veiled women 
became another facet of regulation. Restaurants, cabs, and coaches were 
obliged not to admit veiled women (Kashani-Sabet 2011, 157-9), and veiled 
women were no longer seen walking to the public baths with their bundles as 
they were denied access there too. Veiling was not only redefined as illegal but 
also as immoral as veiling now became obligatory for prostitutes13 who could 
only operate in a certain city district. If they failed to veil, the dancing halls in 
which they worked were shut down (see Hekmat 1975, 72; Amin 1999, 362).  
Schools were particularly affected by the Unveiling Decree. Some female 
teachers resigned while girls who were unwilling to abide by the decree were 
expelled. The political polarization that resulted from the decree stood in strong 
contrast to the idealized pluralism in schools that had been envisioned after the 
Constitutional Revolution. The torn chadors left under the benches of veiled 
girls signaled that they were not welcome among their classmates any longer. 
                                                             
10  Moshfiq Kazemi and many other intellectuals in Iran supported unveiling, which they 
regarded as a measure to prevent violence against women and suppression of women (see 
Moshfiq Kazemi 1985, 315). 
11  Zan-e Ruz magazine, January 8, 1972, No. 353, in Salah’s collection of manuscripts 2005, 
161. 
12  The Center of Historical and Archive Studies, Central Police of Khorasan, File 7454, July 11, 
1936, in Salah’s collection of manuscripts 2005, 286.  
13  Iran National Archive, Interior Ministry Files 17224/51561 December 16, 1935, in Salah’s 
collection of manuscripts 2005, 280. 
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New school uniforms excluded veils and scarves for girls, and teachers were 
not permitted to cover their heads either. According to Najmabadi:  
Girls were withdrawn from the schools and kept at home. Women teachers 
who did not want to unveil resigned from their jobs or were dismissed. Girls’ 
schools that had been sites of women’s public togetherness, with women act-
ing not only as students and teachers but as citizens, actively shaping ‘gen-
dered and patriotic sisterhood’ now became sites of division. (2008, 51)14  
There were also important changes that helped to produce secular soundscapes. 
Shops and cafés were permitted to broadcast the latest songs by female Iranian 
singers. They could do so without being mocked by clerics or asked by con-
servative traders to turn off the music. As Moshfiq Kazemi reported:  
The new music shops in Lalehzar avenue sell the gramophone records in order 
to attract more customers, the chansons and songs of Qamar al-Moluk Vaziri 
and Moluk Zarrabi15 are played in the streets. Not more than a while ago, such 
loud music would have spurred the abhorrence of the clerics or immediately 
incited religious conservatives to rage against the prohibited female voice. 
(1958, 299-300)  
While the secular soundscape was growing, public religious processions were 
forced to retreat into the background. Just three months after the Unveiling 
Decree, Muharram religious processions were treated as disruptions to the 
acoustic urban environment. Under new rules, mourning crowds were obliged 
to hold their ceremonies quietly; the sermons and elegiac singing had to be 
performed soberly while shouting and crying were prohibited and veiled wom-
en denied access to the mourning sessions.16 
Reza Shah’s views on public Muharram rituals, described by Abdullah 
Mostowfi in his voluminous autobiography (1962), are illustrative of the con-
tradictions that were inherent in changes in urban atmospheres in this period. 
Reza Shah himself participated fully in Muharram rituals, but found himself at 
odds with the unrestrained bodily expressions and sounds of the mass rituals. 
According to Mostowfi, Reza Shah did not reject the ritual but felt repelled by 
its superficial ceremonialism. Before Reza Shah’s rule, Muharram rituals had 
been restricted to the state building (tekiyeh dowlat). In the first years of his 
rule, there was a substantial increase in the number of groups holding religious 
                                                             
14  Najmabadi claims that the creation of a new boundary between the religious and the 
secular on the basis of the veil pushed the “modern religious” into an outcast position, there 
are some doubts about her presumption that “girls and women” were imprisoned and 
entirely secluded in their homes. It should be noted that the critical feminist historiography, 
despite being aware of the arbitrariness of the boundary between veiled and unveiled 
women, maintains the boundary by remaining focused exclusively on the secular unveiled 
women. 
15  Two female singers of that period. 
16  Iran National Archive, Prim Ministry Files 103013/9692 April 7, 1937, in Kashani-Sabet 
2011, 158. 
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processions, with each district holding its own party. Singers competed with 
one another in the street and the processions turned into loud shouting. Dense 
crowds of women formed around the processions. Mostowfi suggested that in 
these situations it was “annoyingly impossible to control the crowd and calm 
their noise” (2015, 276), and to open the mourning sessions with a speech.17 
Rules that were introduced placing restrictions on Muharram rituals were sup-
posed to accentuate the secular atmosphere surrounding them.  
A similar shift towards controlling emotional expression can be seen if we 
compare Westernized street theater with the traditional mourning play (tazieh). 
During the early 20th century, new street theaters drew large audiences with 
short, simple stories inspired by the translation of Western dramas. This con-
tributed to the production of secular soundscapes. In contrast to traditional 
mourning plays (tazieh), the street theater used musical instruments and actors 
wore everyday clothing. Religious authorities objected to these new facets of 
theater (see Sanatizade 2015, 135). Women were still excluded from the stage, 
but men playing female roles now had more extensive parts, were unveiled, 
attempted to express feminine emotions vocally, and made efforts to represent 
normal women in everyday life (Sanatizade 2015, 134-7). 
The new scenes of unveiled women in the secular atmosphere of Tehran, sit-
ting in cafés and walking in the busy streets, had a wide-reaching influence on 
social tastes and relations. Sanatizade, who moved to Tehran from the south-
eastern town of Kerman in the early 1930s, described his first encounters with 
the educated women of Tehran with astonishment and great enthusiasm. He 
decided to go against his traditionalist background and propose marriage to a 
young woman he had met in one of the women’s liberation circles. Through the 
narration of his relationship, the reader learns that (1) it was only the ‘properly’ 
trained women from the highest economic strata who were experienced enough 
to be unveiled due to their travels in Europe (ibid., 240-9). Being unveiled was 
very expensive, requiring the purchase of a new wardrobe.18 At the same time, 
given that they were amateurs in this area, women were not accustomed to or 
knowledgeable about how to dress unveiled.19 (2) Despite the fact that women 
had removed their veils, many men did not accept the presence of women in 
public. Ultimately, Sanatizade makes a desperate attempt to escape scandal 
after talking to a woman he did not know (the one he wanted to marry) for “too 
long” and being “too close” to her. Unable to afford a European wedding dress 
for his future wife, Sanatizade returned to his hometown with the social stigma 
of a “seducer.” A photograph taken on his way out of Tehran aptly reflects the 
                                                             
17  On Muharram rituals, see Mostowfi 1985, 270-300. 
18  See Salah (2005, 174-6) and Amin 2004. 
19  Sadeghi (2013) has captured the idea of photography and has focused on the unveiled 
women in different occasions to show the unaccustomed dressing code at odds with their 
way of life. 
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changes in men’s social tastes. The photograph shows a crowd of women wear-
ing black veils, and Sanatizade asks the cleric sitting next to him how he is 
supposed to choose the woman of his life (ibid., 254-5)!20  




In summary, there were various layers to how atmosphere was articulated in 
this period; boundaries were formed and localities divided; regulations were 
put in place and public sentiments guided. All in all, this aimed in various ways 
at governing excessive sentiments, reordering the intensity of emotions, and 
disciplining the expression of public emotions. Certainly, there was always the 
presence of a monocratic ruler who affirmed his role in everything and inter-
fered in all public moods and sentiments with direct impositions of his mun-
dane aristocratic taste. The regime’s fractured interference resulted in an initial 
wave of affective differentiation, reordering rituals, spaces, bodies, and loca-
tions.  
5. Urban Architecture and Sites of Resistance 
The entanglement of the Unveiling Decree and the new urban design program 
are not explicitly addressed in the historical record. However, they become 
evident in the contradictory relationships between citizens’ former habits and 
the architectural orientations of the new generation of Western-educated urban 
                                                             
20  The answer of the cleric is significant inasmuch as it restricts the problem of unveiling to a 
matter of urban life and a marker of social strata. He replies: “In no other religion marriage 
is as easy as in Islam. In the villages women are not covered, you can chat and discuss with 
them. Marrying urban women is for those who search power and social recognition. Choose 
a villager and make a temporary marriage with her. If in this period you realized she is the 
wife you wished for keep her, otherwise let her free after the due date of the marriage” 
(Sanatizade 2015, 255).  
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planners and architects. The question that arises is how the urban architectural 
elements and new sets of materiality introduced in the 1930s and 1940s medi-
ated the decree’s implementation through their impact on inhabitants’ sensibili-
ties. 
Reza Shah’s intentions in governing urban designs were teleological, func-
tional, and guided by images of Western metropoles and capitals. Central to 
this design were wider roads and cement facades. Compared to the multiple 
dispersed efforts to police and govern women’s dress in the 1930s, the Shah’s 
project to give a secular sense to urbanity was conducted in a more systematic 
fashion. The new urban design was meant to be an aesthetic expression of new 
secular lifestyles.  
Traditionally, cities were comprised of series of courtyards, linked by al-
leyways and minor paths. As such, people leaving the inner space of a com-
pound, which was generally inhabited by an extended family, did not have to 
go straight into the street but could instead pass from courtyard to courtyard. 
Covered walkways and gated passages21 within colonies of houses offered 
access to several houses or pavilions. Whereas most of the pavilions were 
destroyed (this was particularly the case in Isfahan, where pavilions were de-
stroyed by the Qajar viceroy Zel al-Soltan in the late 19th century), the passag-
es remained intact in affluent areas. Importantly, as most of the houses belong-
ing to one colony of houses had more than one door to the surrounding streets, 
women could move around without being visible to the police. As a result, 
despite Isfahan having a population of 300,000 women, the city’s police guards 
reported successfully unveiling just 4,000 women (Salah 2005, 195).  
Modern concrete buildings that were beginning to be designed for nuclear 
families, by contrast, were individual domestic units, each of which would be 
directly connected to the street through a door. Whereas the older design was 
characterized by multiple layers of domesticity and graded transitions between 
domestic and public space, the modern city entailed clear boundaries between 
the private and the public.  
In the wake of the unveiling decree, the material layout of the old city and 
the social relations it embodied facilitated various forms of resistance against 
police forces tasked with implementing the decree, as it offered a space in 
which veiled women could continue to move and were shielded from surveil-
lance. The existing infrastructure of the city, including solid walls and large 
courtyards, hindered the fulfillment of the secularization plans and provided 
sites of non-conformity to the secular order. The urban infrastructure supported 
efforts to evade the unveiling attempts, and Reza Shah responded with a policy 
of transparency, trying to eliminate the architectural barriers to his seculariza-
tion plans. 
                                                             
21  Center of Historical and Archive Studies, Exarch letters 418, June 23, 1936, in Salah’s collec-
tion of manuscripts 2005, 296. 
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Image 2:  Abd el-Qafar Map of Tehran, 1891 
 
Source: Najm al-Doleh, Abd el-Qafar. Abd el-Qafar Map of Tehran. 1891. National Cartograph-
ic Center of Iran. Tehran. <www tehranshenasi.com/1395/10/24>. 
 
Reza Shah’s ambition to harness the ‘architectural power’ of the Qajar capital, 
Tehran, lay in his intense efforts to secularize what might be described as its 
‘affective dimension.’ Qajarid architecture was often religious, with such ele-
ments as twelve gates, five wards, 114 towers and large harems in their palaces. 
From 1932 onwards, Reza Shah’s planning decisions signaled his increasing 
rejection of such architecture. He ordered the destruction of two of the twelve 
gates, which represented the twelve Shi’ite imams. He also ordered the demoli-
tion of the harem in the Golestan Palace, the royal Qajar courthouse, in line 
with his legal reform to end polygamy. Moshfiq Kazemi, who participated in 
huge building projects in this period, commented on the pressure from the court 
to destroy the portals22 as follows:  
                                                             
22  Ervand Abrahamian writes: “Reza Shah destroyed much of the old city, including its twelve 
gates, five wards, tekiyehs and winding alleyways, with the explicit goal of making Tehran 
an ‘up-to-date capital.’ He gave the avenues such names as Shah, […] Pahlavi […] He 
eliminated gardens named after such aristocrats as Sepahsalar and Farmanfarma. […] He 
licensed five cinemas in northern Tehran […] Around these cinemas developed a new 
middle-class lifestyle with modern cafés, boutiques, theaters, restaurants, and bookstores” 
(2008, 92).  
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Malik Feysal, the king of Iraq, was about to visit23 and all organizations were 
getting ready to serve him. One order was to destroy the portal of the old 
Naghareh Khaneh, situated at the entrance of Ark and the portal to the Marble 
Palace such that the courtier’s guests could drive up to the Golestan Palace in 
their cars. Indeed, these were both historical buildings but since the decision 
was made, actualizing it was inevitable. (1958, 306)  
Significantly, the destruction of the Naghareh Khaneh portal had an impact on 
Tehran’s inhabitants’ sense of temporality as the portal had been where the 
kettledrum and horn had been played to announce prayer times and the closing 
of the gate at midnight.24 When the portal was destroyed, these religious mark-
ers were also eliminated, adding to the production of secular urban space. 
From 1936, the remaining city gates were used to closely monitor women’s 
dress. The gates were protected by guards who meticulously scrutinized the 
material and sizes of women’s hats and checked for any form of ‘improper’ 
unveiling, e.g., being wrapped in long scarves.25 Unveiling became the yard-
stick for broader notions of ‘modern dress.’ People arriving from the country-
side were not permitted to wear nomadic and other kinds of ‘ethnic’ clothing. 
To ensure that unveiling controls were effective, police and municipal officers 
were systematically distributed across the city according to criteria such as 
population density and levels of resistance. Officers were thus concentrated on 
the main gates to the cities, major streets, main squares, and markets and would 
threaten to report or arrest women who did not conform. 
As a result of the Street Widening Act of November 13, 1933,26 the front-
yards of houses were made narrower in order to create more space for roads 
and the old-style entrances were replaced with doors that could be locked 
(Karimi 2013, 51f). This made it more difficult for veiled women to evade 
guards patrolling the neighborhood. At the same time, new electric street lamps 
broke the darkness of the nights that had afforded veiled women some level of 
invisibility. As Sanatizade observed:  
It was already one hour after the sunset when we passed Shah Abdolazim Gate 
to enter Tehran. The first thing that attracted me was the electric lamps giving 
light to the streets in the darkness of night, I had never seen them before. 
(1967, 111) 
                                                             
23  This visit took place on May 6, 1932. 
24  See Abdullah Mostowfi, Vol. 1, 272, and Vol. 2, 43. Also Najmi (1969, 272). 
25  The uncanny appearance of some women wrapping themselves in long scarves, bed sheets, 
and large hats was a subject of dispute among women and the guards. For more on the 
guards’ reports, see: Center of Historical and Archive Studies, Exarch of Khorasan letters 
291, June 1, 1936 in Salah’s collection of manuscripts 2005, 285-6. 
26  E. Ehlers and W. Floor, Urban Changes in Iran 1920-1941 (Iranian Studies 26, 3-4 (1993): 
252-75) as referenced in Karimi 2013, 52. 
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Shrines and cemeteries, and the areas surrounding them, provide a good exam-
ple of the contradictory implementation of the Unveiling Decree.27 Although 
the state did not oblige women to unveil during their pilgrimage to the shrines 
and funerals, guards placed at gates of the shrines and cemeteries set re-
strictions. In a deed to the interior ministry from July 5, 1936, it is reported that 
“the guards have no right to interfere within the sacred realm of the shrine. 
[However,] I suppose 100 men are enough to protect the surrounding” (Salah 
2005, 152). 
Image 3:  Tehran 1976 (last years of Pahlavi Regime) 
 
Source: Guide to Tehran Historical Maps. Tehran-e Markazi Map. 1976. Archive of Tehran. 
<www.tehrandoc.blogfa.com/category/1>. 
 
The ultimate goal of Reza Shah’s Unveiling Decree was to homogenize the 
faces of the cities by eradicating signs of tribal affiliation, religious belief, and 
sectarian membership. Instead, economic class alone was to be considered a 
distinguishing factor (Abrahamian 2008, 92).28 This involved the destruction of 
                                                             
27  For example, the muncipal officers in Khorasan were in charge of stopping veiled women at 
the entrance of the cemetery and forbidding them from entering Bagh-e Mazar; the Iran 
National Archive, Interior Ministry Files 541/5, June 20, 1936 in Salah’s collection of 
manuscripts 2005, 284. 
28 See Wohrab-Sahr, Burchardt for the discussion about various forms of secularity and their 
guiding ideas. On the “life-world related” category of decentralized secularity, they 
introduce “balancing and accommodating diversity” as a function of secularity (2012, 890). 
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architectural barriers and the building of a transparent city that left no place to 
hide.  
Tekyeh Dowlat, a place of rituals and religious processions, particularly used 
by Sufi orders, was certainly the most significant of the sites that were de-
stroyed. Built in accordance with Western theater saloons in late 19th century, 
tekyeh Dowlat was the focal point of Muharram rituals under the Qajars. Dur-
ing the two months of Muharram and Safar, several mourning sessions, reli-
gious sermons, and mourning plays (tazieh) were performed in it. Towards the 
end of the Qajar Dynasty, the place received less attention by the state, which 
was in charge of holding the annual ceremony with fervid mourners, flamboy-
ant processions, tazieh groups, and extravagant tables (Mostowfi 2015, 290-
96). The first definite change occurred when the site hosted the exhibition of 
domestic industry and products. Together with many other tekyehs that closed 
with the promulgation of an act against mourning plays in 1933,29 tekyeh Dow-
lat lost its importance as a public site of religious processions and was later 
turned into a bank by the second Pahlavi Shah. 
Between 1936 and 1940, efforts to demolish the existing structures of Teh-
ran and redevelop it into a transparent city extended to residential areas, hous-
es, and facades. The plans accelerated to the extent that Tehran was described 
as a “flattened ruin, altered by an earthquake.”30  
A report produced by the American embassy in 1940 estimated the number 
of demolished houses to be between 15,000 to 30,000 (Karimi 2013, 68). Most 
significantly, these urban reconstructions corresponded to the government’s 
policies for the creation of ‘liberated unveiled women’: 
Forced unveiling created a liberated Iranian woman and an enlightened 
housewife who was supposed to live in modern houses. There were similari-
ties between the ways in which the press portrayed the Iranian vis-à-vis the 
‘new’ Iranian house. Both were subject to a cult of rationalization. (Karimi 
2013, 59)31 
What Karimi calls the “cult of rationalization” within urban design was sup-
posed to produce a sense of secular urbanism. Rather than achieving this, many 
buildings were changed only superficially, with altered facades, or left incom-
plete. The half-built buildings had puzzling effects on the inhabitants of Teh-
ran. The buildings neither succeeded in representing the imagined secular ideal 
of urban design, nor did they serve to encourage people to network on a profes-
sional level. 
                                                             
29  See Goljan/Afshar-Zand ( 2014, 116-118) and Aghaie (2004). 
30  U.S. State Department Archives, Engert, dispatch 1830, “Change in the City of Tehran,” 
891.101/3, May 10, 1940, Tehran, as referenced in Karimi 2013, 68.  
31  As Pamela Karimi explains in her study on the history of urban architecture from the 19th 
century onwards, the simplicity of architecture in the 1940s, distancing from old styles and 
historical motifs, reflected an open form of urban interaction connected to the idea of 
“liberated” and “unveiled” women.  
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Image 4:  Tekyeh Dowlat 1890s 
 
 Image 5: Tekyeh Dowlat in 1925 Exhibition for Domestic Industries (Sanatizade 
2015, 211) 
 
Source: Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies. Female Spectators at Tekyeh 
Dowlat. 1893. <www.iichs.org/index.asp?id=2009&doc_cat=1>. 
 
In his travel diary, a foreign visitor described 1940s Tehran as “Holly-
woodesque,”32 noting that the facades “seemed to have no backs at all and they 
ended suddenly in space as if they were a part of an unfinished set which would 
be never used in film-land” (Grigor 2009, 132). 
                                                             
32  Compare with the concept of arabesque and dream-kitsch in Walter Benjamin. 
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6. Domesticity  
Changes in the construction of houses in this period reflect the ties between the 
Unveiling Decree and changes in domesticity. The construction of houses is 
one tangible area in which the implementation of secular ideas was negotiated 
and challenged. Changes in regimes of domesticity are crucial to understanding 
the radical reconstruction of the city within a period of less than 20 years.  
Traditional homes had a unified indoor space shared by extended families 
and their servants; they also had a yard in front of and behind the house. These 
were replaced by modern roadside buildings containing apartments that housed 
nuclear families. Rooms in the new apartments had specified functions, and the 
buildings were situated opposite one another, allowing views into neighboring 
apartments. The alterations in the architectural style of people’s homes insti-
gated far-reaching changes of perspectives and attitudes among the people 
experiencing these new living conditions. 
The year 1935 marked the opening of the first cement factory close to Teh-
ran. This would refashion the face of the city (Karimi, 2013, 61). From the 
beginning, the use of cement was limited to “skillful architects”33 leading to a 
monopoly of state-employed, Western-educated architects who did not follow 
inherited models with houses centered around the yard and the main sources of 
water. Instead, rooms were differentiated according to their functions. As a new 
material element, cement realized the division of rooms into separate spaces for 
sleeping, dining, and cooking, which was at odds with the former embracing of 
all these functions in one unified space shared by extended families.34 Kitchens 
moved from the backyards into the confined space of the apartment and the 
toilets and bathrooms from their collective and public use to that of nuclear 
family members. These kitchens provided new forms of privacy and autonomy 
for women. Religious families started to integrate private bathing facilities into 
their courtyards in order to circumvent the restriction on veiled women entering 
the public baths35. This perpetuated ideas of hygiene, which had been intro-
                                                             
33  The term was used to describe those who had been trained to use cement, unlike self-
trained builders who were unfamiliar with the use of new construction materials (Karimi 
2013, 62). 
34  Karimi describes the traditional houses as being based upon “temporal consideration,” such 
that the condition of sleeping side-by-side on the floor allowed sexual relation between the 
couples while the same carpet was covered with another piece of cloth for dining (ibid., 29). 
35  A manuscript related to Khorasan states that it is the municipality’s responsibility to watch 
out for veiled women, refuse them entry to public baths, and report them. It is also 
mentioned that, for more security, female spies are needed in women’s public baths to 
search their clothes and investigate whether they were breaking the law (Iran National 
Archive, Interior Ministry Files 541, June 20, 1936 in Salah’s collection of manuscripts 2005, 
283). For more information about hygiene education for women, see Kashani-Sabet (2006, 
1-29). 
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duced two decades before the decree. In general, the construction of baths 
inside the walls of the houses engendered a new sense of the care of the self 
among middle-class urban families.  
The cement revolution pushed the problem of elusiveness to a new level for 
two basic reasons. First, given the fragile nature of formal administrative sys-
tems, large numbers of houses were built using informal imitations of the blue-
prints of skillful architects. Second, getting access to cement for personal build-
ing projects was rare, as cement production was not sufficient for the major 
construction plans for bridges, railways, and houses. This resulted in half-built 
homes and allowed for individual tastes regarding the final look of the building 
and the interactions between its inhabitants. In one instance, architects deliber-
ated over the position and sizes of windows in a new home for over a decade in 
efforts to establish some level of ‘invisibility’ and ‘freedom’ of action inside 
the house. The length of these discussions about windows highlights the cultur-
al significance of the conflict between transparency and elusiveness during the 
‘cement revolution.’  
To further build the image of the ‘unveiled’ woman, technology such as 
washing machines, ovens, and vacuum cleaners arrived in Iranian homes,36 to 
create a technically adept individual, standing with a straight back and an apron 
with the cooking pot on the stove. Such images of ’the mothers of the nation,’ 
depicting women in well-equipped kitchens or at work, would be printed in the 
women’s magazines of the 1960s, long after the Unveiling Decree had been 
rescinded.37 
At roughly the same time as the cement factory opened, the notion of ‘secu-
larization from the inside’ was promoted through the popularization of new 
kinds of parties. While such parties had already been part of the social and 
cultural lives of private associations and intellectuals, they were now adopted 
by state employees who were ordered to attend such parties with their wives on 
a regular basis.38 Many writers have described these parties as the official stag-
ing of the ‘unveiling.’ Unlike the discussions in intellectual circles, conversa-
tions in these parties would take place between women and couples and would 
focus on domestic issues such as dressing and appearance in home and public. 
In order to participate in discourse on domesticity, upper middle-class women 
who presumably occupied the frontiers of unveiling had to familiarize them-
                                                             
36  These ‘dream’ materials of urban domestic life were imported for the first time by American 
companies in the 1950s. Karimi writes, “American companies such as General Electric and 
the York Corporation introduced cooler chests, ovens, washing machines and shiny utensils 
into Iranian kitchens” (2013, 2). On page 95 of her book, there is a picture of a woman 
squatting in a corner of the yard cooking on a brick-made oven with coals while knitting 
her veil on the two edges behind the neck. 
37  See, for example, Kashani-Sabet 2011, 200-5 and Karimi 2013, 84-120. 
38  For the state-initiated parties, see Tajadod Newspaper, January 15, 1936, no. 1807 and 1809, 
in Salah’s collection of manuscripts 2005, 172-6. 
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selves with new dressing styles. More importantly, the order of interactions at 
these parties signaled that professional criteria outweighed familial relations 
among the participants in significance. Whereas the quasi-intellectual circles of 
the new generation of Western-educated young officials welcomed the idea of 
the parties, other employees and high-ranking older generations participated 
because they feared the discrimination or stigmatization that could result from 
their absence.39  
This shift, whereby men would spend more and more time in professional 
networks led to changes in the domestic order, shaped by the consumerism of 
women seeking the correct ‘look’ for the parties. The lavish parties influenced 
marital life making women responsible for their ‘unveiled’ appearance while 
the husbands of non-abiding women were threatened with suspension from 
their government positions. 
Moreover, the changes to veiled women’s mobility changed family life as 
well. New divisions of housework, networks, and material substitutions 
emerged in these houses. According to current feminist criticism, the immedi-
ate result was the increasing patriarchal power of men who carried out addi-
tional tasks like daily shopping that had been formerly undertaken by women.40 
Furthermore, women had to surrender a range of their former outdoor activities 
to men’s presence or interference. Deciding about the schooling of younger 
girls, accompanying and restricting visits to relatives and ancestors in the 
cemeteries illustrate the conjoining of the state and male power within the 
home. 
7. Conclusion 
Complementing the feminist critique of the gendered power in secularization 
processes, this article drew on the dialectics of institutions and self-formation 
on the one hand, and the anthropology of space and habitus (Bourdieu, Fou-
cault) on the other hand. I showed how veiling and unveiling became active 
forces in the reordering of society, introducing new spatial boundaries between 
religion and the secular. 
From this perspective, the differentiation between ‘the veiled’ and ‘the un-
veiled’ was not limited to bodily regimes, but spilled into the realms of every-
                                                             
39  The punishments for the employees who did not participate regularly in these parties 
without testified excuse were varied. Sometimes the person was expelled and in other cases 
his income was cut or he had to replace his absence by going to the mosque in the company 
of his unveiled wife. See Iran National Library, Interior Ministry Files 3637, circular 13011, 
December 21, 1937, as referenced in Salah, 177.  
40  Hoodfar writes on this point, “women became even more dependent on men since they had 
to ask for men’s collaboration in order to perform activities they had previously performed 
independently” (1997, 247-79). 
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day material urban life, linking tensions between secularity and religion to the 
demand to homogenize urban space, citizenship, and public participation.  
In this sense, secular transparent social relations impinged upon and were 
realized by city design, architecture, and the power of atmospheres. This im-
plies that secularity is not always about functional differentiations and rational 
solutions. Instead, I suggest that secularization implies an affective dimension 
in that it ties secular and religious spaces to particular kinds of affect. Street 
planning, new materials, and topographies led to largely new affective percep-
tions, sensibilities, and re-assemblages regarding where to go in the new arena 
of urban spaces, with whom to affiliate, and which functions to exercise. The 
elusiveness of the buildings, balancing the ‘visible’ and ‘the invisible’ of the 
social life, against the scope of building transparent social relations signaled the 
significant role played by local initiatives coordinated independently of central 
state power, in reordering spaces and segmenting them. The relation between 
affect and secularity corresponds to the networks of multiple relations between 
things, localities and inhabitants and therefore lacks a fixed center, an anchor-
age to a full-fledged horizon of secularization. Instead of being an emerging, 
nationally resonant cultural form, secularity acquired its effectiveness in partic-
ular locales through spatial politics: through urban rejuvenation, police vio-
lence, consumerism, and new social behavior within intellectual circles on the 
one hand, and extended families in traditional houses who lived in neighbor-
hood networks on the other. 
That said, I would argue that functional differentiation and the affective di-
mension of secularity are actually interrelated and complementary. More re-
search is needed to advance the sociological understanding of materializations 
of secularity in connection to city gestalt. 
References 
Abrahamian, Ervand. 2008. The History of Modern Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Afary, Janet. 2009. Sexual Politics in Modern Iran. Cambridge University Press. 
Aghaie, Kamran S. 2004. The Martyrs of Karbala: Shia Symbols and Rituals in 
Moderm Iran. University of Washington Press. 
Ahmadzadeh, Mohamad A. 2016. Arzyabi va naghde mas’aleye kashf-e hijab az 
manzar-e ghodrat va siasat-e farhangi 1305-1320 (A Critical Study of the 
Unveiling, Power and Cultural Politics Approach 1926-1941). Jamee-pajuhi 
Farhangi Humanities and Cultural Studies Research Center 6 (1): 1-26. 
Alaimo, Stacy. 2008. Trans-Corporeal Feminisms and the Ethical Space of Nature. 
In Material Feminisms, ed. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, 237-62. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Amin, Camron M. 1999. Propaganda and Remembrance: Gender, Education and 
the Women’s Awakening of 1936. Iranian Studies 32 (3): 351-86. 
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  203 
Amin, Camron M. 2004. Importing ‘Beauty Culture’ into Iran in the 1920’s and 
1930’s: Mass Marketing Individualism in an Age of Anti-Imperialist Sacrifice. 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24 (1): 18-35. 
Anderson, Ben. 2014. Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions. 
Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
Becci, Irene, and Marian Burchardt. 2013. Religion Takes place: Producing Urban 
Locality. In Topographies of Faith: Religion in Urban Space, ed. Irene Becci, 
Marian Burchardt and Jose Casanova, 1-25. Leiden and Boston: Brill.  
Benjamin, Walter. 2004. Dream Kitsch. In Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings: 
1927-1930, transl. Rodney Livingstone, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland 
and Gary Smith, 3-16. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 
Bille, Mikkel, and Tim Flohr Sorensen. 2016. In to the Fog of Architecture. In 
Elements of Architecture: Assembling Archaeology, Atmosphere and the 
Performance of Building Space, ed. Mikkel Bille and Tim Flohr Sorensen, 1-30. 
Oxon and New York: Routledge. 
Böhme, Gernot. 1993. Atmosphere as the Fundamental Concept of a New 
Aesthetics. Thesis Eleven 36: 113-26. 
Buchli, Victor. 2013. An Anthropology of Architecture. London: Bloomsbury. 
Chehabi, Houshang. 2003. The Banning of the Veil and its Consequences. In The 
making of modern Iran: State and Society under Reza Shah (1921-1941), ed. 
Stephanie Cronin, 193-205. London: Routledge.  
Cinar, Alev. 2005. Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey. Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press. 
Collins, Randal. 2004. Interaction Ritual Chain. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Deleuze, Gill. 1995. Negotiations: 1972-1990. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Dowlatabadi, Yahya. 1952. Hayat-e Yahya (Yahya’s Life). Tehran: Ibni-Sina 
Ettehadieh, Mansoureh. 2004. The Origins and Developments of the Women’s 
Movement in Iran 1906-1941. In Women in Iran. From 1800 to the Islamic 
Republic, ed. Guity Nashat and Lois Beck, 85-106. Urbana & Chicago, 
University of Illinois Press 
Fragner, Bert. 1979. Persische Memorienliteratur als Quelle zur neueren 
Geschichte Irans. Wiesbaden: Frantz Steiner Verlag.  
Göle, Nilüfer. 1996. The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling. Michigan: 
The University of Michigan Press.  
Goljan, Mehdi, and Sepideh Afshar-Zand. 2014. Tekyeh doalat va marasem-e 
mazhabi-e An (Tekyeh Dowlat and its Religious Fests). Tehran University’s 
Historical Researches Journal 6 (1): 105-21. 
Grigor, Talinn. 2009. Building Iran: Modernism, Architecture and National 
Heritage under the Pahlavi Monarchs. New York: Priscope Publication Ltd. 
Hikmat, Ali A. 1975. Si khatirih az asre farkhondeye Pahlavi (Thirty Stories from 
Pahlavi Time). sine loco. 
Hoodfar, Homa. 1997. The Veil in Their Minds and on Our Heads: Veiling Practice 
and Muslim Women. In The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital, ed. 
Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, 247-79. New York: Duke University Press. 
Karimi, Pamela. 2013. Domesticity and Consumer Culture in Iran: Interior 
Revolution of a Modern Era. London: Rutledge. 
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  204 
Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. 2006. The Politics of Reproduction: Maternalism and 
Women's Hygiene in Iran 1896-1941. International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 38: 1-29. 
Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. 2011. Conceiving Citizens: Women and the Politics of 
Motherhood in Iran. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mahdavi, Shirin. 2003. Reza Shah Pahlavi and Women: A Re-evaluation. In The 
Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Reza Shah 1921-1941, ed. 
Stephanie Cronin, 181-93. London: Routledge. 
Mahmood, Saba. 2005. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist 
Subject. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Moshfiq Kazemi, Morteza. 1985. Ruzegar va andishe-ha (Time and Thoughts). 
Tehran: Ibni-Sina. 
Mostowfi, Abdullah. 2015. Sharhi zendegani man: Tarikhi ejtemaei va edari doare-
ye Qajar (My Lifestory: The Social and Bureaucratic History of Qajars). Tehran: 
Hermes Publication. 
Najmabadi, Afsaneh. 2008. Unveiling Feminism. In Secularisms, ed. Janet 
Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, 39-57. New York: Duke University Press.  
Najmabadi, Afsaneh. 2007. Authority and Agency: Revisiting Women’s Activism 
during Reza Shah Period. In The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society 
and the State in Turkey and Iran, ed. Touraj Atabaki, 159-77. New York: I B 
Turis in association with International Institute of Social History Amsterdam. 
Najmi, Naser. 1969. Dar al-khilafe-ie Tehran (Tehran House of Calif). Tehran: 
Amir-Kabir. 
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2002. Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in 
Turkey. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2012. Make-Believe Spaces: Affective Geography in a 
Postwar Polity. New York: Duke University Press. 
Nielsen, Morten. 2016. Into Architecture: House-Building and Acentered 
Personhood in Maputo, Mozambique. In Elements of Architecture: Assembling 
Archaeology, Atmosphere and the Performance of Building Space, ed. Mikkel 
Bille and Tim Flohr Sorensen, 273-87. Oxon and New York: Routledge. 
Nökel, Sigrid. 2002. Die Töchter der Gastarbeiter und der Islam: Zur Soziologie 
alltagsweltlicher Anerkennungspolitiken. Bielefeld: Transcript. 
Paidar, Parvin. 1995. Women and Political Process in Twentieth Century Iran. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pink, Sara. 2015. Doing Sensory Ethnography. London: Sage Publication. 
Rostam-Kolayi Jasmin. 2003. Expanding Agendas for the New Iranian Woman: 
Family Law, Work, and Unveiling. London: Routledge, 2003  
Rostam-Kolayi, Jasmin, and Afshin Matin-Asgari. 2014. Unveiling Ambiguities: 
Revisiting 1930s Iran’s Kashf-I Hijab Campaign. In Anti-veiling Campaigns in 
the Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and the Politics of dress, ed. Stephan 
Cronin, 121-40, London, New York: Routledge. 
Rypka, Jan. 1959. Iranische Literaturgeschichte. Leipzig: Veb Otto Harrasowitz. 
Sadeghi, Fatima. 2013. Kashf-I Hijab: Bazkhani-e Yek Modakhele-ye Modern 
(Unveiling: Rereading of a modern interference). Tehran: Nigahe Moaser. 
Salah, Mehdi. 2005. Kashf-e Hijab: Zamineha, payamadha va vakoneshha 
(Unveiling: Context, Consequences and Reactions: Manuscript Collection). 
Tehran: Moassese-ie Motaleat va Pajouhesh-e Siasi  
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  205 
Sanatizade, Abdulhussein. 2015. Ruzigari ke gozasht (The Gone Time) ed. Mehdi 
Ganjavi and Mehrnaz Mansuri. Gilan Publishing House.  
Stauth, Georg. 1999. Authentizität und kulturelle Globalisierung: Paradoxien 
kulturübergreifender Gesellschaft. Bielefeld: Transcript. 
Thrift, Nigel. 2000. Afterword. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
18: 213-55. 
Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika, and Marian Burchardt. 2012. Multiple Secularities: Toward 
a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities. Comparative Sociology 11: 875-
909. 
Yaneva, Albena. 2013. Mapping Controversies in Architecture. Surrey: Ashgate. 
 
 Historical Social Research 
Historische Sozialforschung 
All articles published in HSR Special Issue 44 (2019) 3: 
Islamicate Secularities in Past and Present. 
 
Markus Dressler, Armando Salvatore & Monika Wohlrab-Sahr 
Islamicate Secularities: New Perspectives on a Contested Concept. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.7-34 
Armando Salvatore 
Secularity through a ‘Soft Distinction’ in the Islamic Ecumene? Adab as a Counterpoint to Shari‘a. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.35-51 
Neguin Yavari 
The Political Regard in Medieval Islamic Thought. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.52-73 
Florian Zemmin 
Validating Secularity in Islam: The Sociological Perspective of the Muslim Intellectual Rafiq al-‘Azm (1865-1925). 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.74-100 
Samuli Schielke 
Is Prose Poetry a Conspiracy Against the Noble Qur’an? Poetics, Humans, and God in Contemporary Egypt. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.101-126 
Katerina Dalacoura 
“Islamic Civilization” as an Aspect of Secularization in Turkish Islamic Thought. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.127-149 
Mohammad Magout  
Transnationalizing Multiple Secularities: A Comparative Study of the Global Ismaՙili Community. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.150-179 
Sana Chavoshian 
Secular Atmospheres: Unveiling and Urban Space in Early 20th Century Iran. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.180-205 
Brannon D. Ingram 
A ‘Modern’ Madrasa: Deoband and Colonial Secularity. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.206-225 
Yee Lak Elliot Lee 




Politics of Taxonomy in Postcolonial Indonesia: Ethnic Traditions between Religionisation and Secularisation. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.264-289 
 
For further information on our journal, including tables of contents, article abstracts, 
and our extensive online archive, please visit https://www.gesis.org/en/hsr.  
i t ri l i l r  
ist ris  i lf rs  
